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Abstract
The aim of this article is to examine the punitive differences after 
come into force of the law 1/2004 of 28 of december, (LVG) because 
this law protect only women and not men, studying the differences 
in the law enforcement, and what criminal consequences will have, 
in every single case, depending on the victim, if it’s a woman or if 
it’s a man.
In order to research the objective and fulfill tasks set the research 
project, the applied methods during the research progress are the 
following: analytical, inductive, logical, systemical. Also the method 
of the analysis of literature, the comparative legal method and 
theoretical method of research to investigate, analyse and summarize 
information of publications.
The methods chosen are very important in analysing the Spanish 
law, case law materials to opinions of legislator and law scientists.
Supported by the inductive and comparative method is used in 
order to make it able to analyse individual aspects of the law 1/2004 
and the criminal laws its application and consequences in differents 
cases, from several theorethical conclusions.
The logical and analytical method was used in order to study 
content of the law, its protections to the victims and punishment and 
if with its application the society is better and secure for everyone, 
analyzing the effects in the citizens.
The overall object of this article “The punitive distinction on 
grounds of sex in the penal code and the organic law 1/2004 of 28 
december on integral protection measures against gender violence” 
is a national human rights interests, however the direct object is 
national interests in the field of domestic violence and violence 
against the women, and the protection of the woman in the society 
and her freedom and development as a human being. Moreover the 
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the application of this law creates social conflicts, make deeper the 
differences between man and woman and it doesn’t solve effectively 
the problem of the violence against the women.
The subject matter of this article is the Spanish Criminal law 
in connection with the violence against women and its effective 
application and using different methods to check if the principle of 
equality in the law and of sexes is applied in Spain in an egalitarian 
and fair way. The most common cases are the physical and psychic 
aggressions, threats and coercion, and this is what the law 1/2004 
and the Spanish criminal code try to sorted out.
Also, this law is strong criticized by many sectors, and in this 
article it’s defended the position  that this law should be applied to 
both sexes, without distinction and so, to try to convert the society in 
a space of equality and justice.
The main conclusion shows that actually in Spain, the society 
is suffering a very unfair law, specially for men, and does not help 
really to women when they are assaulted.
It must to be changed this law, being applied to everyone without 
exceptions, that’s means, without making differences between 
woman and man.
Keywords: gender violence, victim, integral protection measures 
against gender violence.
Introduction
Wondered if the organic law 1/2004 of 28 december on 
comprehensive protective measures against gender violence, violate 
rights and freedoms recognized in the Spanish Constitution (herein 
after SC), since often this issue has given rise to a variety of opinions, 
even this diversity of views to  the highest constitutional sphere1. 
Rights and principles such as equality, presumption of innocence 
and guilt or that of penal proportionality, have been discussed to the 
point of having raised issues and resources of unconstitutionality, 
to be understood that the drafting of the organic law 1/2004 of 28 
December on measures of integral protection against gender violence 
(in hereinafter LVG) and reforms coupled and that has meant his 
entry into force seriously injured these rights and that therefore  such 
a law would be manifestly unconstitutional.
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Without doubt, the reform that has attracted more controversy by 
its wording seemingly unconstitutional, is the operated in the Penal 
Code, in articles such as the art.148.4 or article 153.1 153.2, or the 
art.171 or the art.172. The drafting of the reformed article 148.4CP 
can contradict the arts.1.1, 9, 10, 14, 17, 24.2 and 25.1CE, since 
invading the sphere of the principle of equality, connected with the 
values of freedom, the dignity of the person and justice. You can be 
understood with this wording is discriminating adversely to men, 
since it is situated as aggressor only men, just because the simple fact 
of being a man and as a distinguishing criterion, strictly excluding 
women. 
The LVG, only refers to women as victims, understanding them 
as such when it is exercised exclusively by the male, with a vis 
compulsive that it affects and impacts on the physical and/or mental 
health women and done as a manifestation of discrimination and/
or the situation of inequality and the power relations of men over 
women, when you have had with them, a relationship of affection 
with or without cohabitation or they are or have been their spouses. 
A priori it seems, makes what is punished with a bonus added to 
men by the simple fact of being a men and makes them aside and 
even deprives them are measures for the protection of this law, as 
if there were physical or psychological abuse or aggression by the 
woman to the man in the family or domestic level for example with 
or without cohabitation, which is exactly the same that regulates the 
LVG, but conversely, because only protects the woman, not a man as 
stated in article 1 of the act.
It’s true that also in the assaults of this nature, statistically 
speaking the highest percentage corresponds to the women, being 
a small percentage men-victims of physical or psychic, assaulted by 
his wife or partner.
However this does not always reveal the true proportions of 
the problem, primarily for two reasons; First, the fear of ridicule 
is facing the man to report crimes of this nature, since we live in a 
still conservative society and in certain aspects even sexist, being in 
many cases, the woman herself, seeing such behavior, correct and up 
to fair, in which the role of the man is being a tough guy introverted 
in their feelings that, failing them, dominator of all situations with 
poise and denouncing you’re a victim of abuse or discrimination by a 
woman would behave in the man-victim a glaring disgrace and a real 
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challenge to confront lodged the complaint and others throughout 
the process which should be rigged. The second, by the own drafting 
of the LVG, since as stated above only dispense exclusive  protection 
to women at the expense of the man going in our opinion, contrary 
to the principles of effective judicial protection and principle of 
equality of the sexes, in addition to those mentioned above.
This is amazing and maybe paradoxical or even absurd, because 
it goes against what the own LVG defends2, whereas gender equality 
between male and female, no preponderance of none on the other, 
since this law only be eligible women, discriminated against and 
away on one side the men. Therefore, we can say that the LVG 
as it stands, discriminates against men, violating the principles of 
equality and of innocence, by discriminating against men because of 
inequality, in relation to women. 
There is a serious contradiction in which incurs the LVG, because 
when you try to help legislating, to soften the problem of inequality of 
sexes, advocating for a joint position in society, which it’s happens is 
the opposite; it’s protects the female sex to the detriment of the male. 
This clear and evident also goes against the principle of equality of 
sexes and the presumption of innocence, included in the SC and the 
men itself, since if the law attending both genders equally, certainly 
more men would dare to denounce the mistreatment in the family, 
domestic sphere or any other and this would no doubt help gender 
equality reflected in society.
I The reform of the Penal Code with the entry into force 
of the Organic Law 1/2004 of 28 December on measures of 
Integral Protection against gender-based violence 
Spain signed the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and 
combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul 
Convention) in 20143. The main provisions were the States which 
ratify the Convention must criminalize several offences, including: 
psychological violence stalking; physical violence;  sexual violence, 
including rape, explicitly covering all engagement in non-consensual 
acts of a sexual nature with a person, forced marriage; female genital 
mutilation,   forced abortion  and forced sterilization. 
The Convention states, that sexual harassment must be subject to 
“criminal or other legal sanction”. However, Spain through the Law 
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1/2004, mentioned above, (pioneer in Europe, was the first one) and 
the Criminal regulation (Código Penal, herein after CP),  it punished 
already almost all the offences from the Istambul Convention of 
2014, and it wasn’t any new thing for the Spanish authorities. Despite, 
Spain usually sign all the Council and agreements in Europa’s 
frame, inside its borders, this is another thing, because there are big 
differences between man and woman, how we have been explaining, 
because the Law 1/2004 (LVG) just gives protection to woman and 
not to the man, without any juridical acceptable raison, in about 
domestic violence.
The entry into force of the LVG, reflects the seriousness what 
we have been explaining, since we have a problem whose point of 
discord, is in the different feasibility procediment- criminal, because 
for the same facts, the existing legal procedures is different, searing 
physical or mental damage, shall apply to LVG with measures of 
protection that this is rigged in his case. 
On the contrary if a woman assaulted a man that has been a 
relationship with or without cohabitation shall not apply the LVG, it 
will be processed as a crime or failure in your case, provided for and 
punished in the arts. 147 et seq. and art. 617 C.P. respectively. 
This example shows the injustice of the LVG, resulting in practice 
the opposite of what it claims to, as recorded in his explanatory 
statement, one of the primary objectives is to fight for gender equality, 
in practice being an instrument made to the measure for the accusing 
parties and even the judge, because it gives them the possibility of 
that determine life frequently of several people or a family, learns 
summarily and that in the majority of cases does not come to resolve 
anything on the contrary, aggravates situations, causing unnecessary 
death and all this by gravity and the exaggeration of the measures to 
be taken and how it adopted, which tend to be in the majority of cases 
of summarily, as stated above, and that we will analyze properly in 
another section, which are the fair measure in the decision making 
by the judge of the order of protection and other measures associated 
with carrying. This happens  frequently because the current LVG 
does not solve problems but rather the create, doing bigger the 
differences between sexes that nobody benefits from. 
Therefore according to the LVG, the notion of victim only can 
correspond to a woman-victim that as you outlined, that suffer 
violence as an act of discrimination against the same and in addition 
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the law requires that there is a relationship of particular affection 
between the author of the acts of violence (necessarily a male, as 
already mentioned) and the woman, victim of the same. Specifically, 
it requires: 
- that the woman had contracted marriage with the perpetrator 
of the crime, although the marriage had broken (case of 
marital separation, nullity of marriage or divorce) and 
regardless of the time elapsed since the marriage breakdown. 
- that the woman had been united with the perpetrator of the 
crime by a relationship of affection similar to marriage, 
even in the case that there is no coexistence. That is, the 
domestic partners or the simple relationship of courtship in 
which there is no coexistence are included here. Here too, 
as in the case of marriage, it doesn’t matter that there has 
been a breakdown in the relationship between the victim 
and the author of the offence nor the elapsed time. 
It can also be understood that the drafting of article 148.4 CP 
in relation to the basic type of article 147 CP, violate the right to 
the presumption of innocence, connected with the principle of guilt, 
contained in article 24.2 CE, because it establishes a presumption 
“iure et de iure”, and therefore no possibility of proof to the contrary, 
that the male violence towards women, linked by ties of affection, 
is a manifestation of discrimination, as it seems to be taken for 
granted in the LVG art.1.1 that all violence against women by part 
of their partners or ex-partners, is a manifestation of discrimination, 
the situation of inequality and the relations of power from men over 
women. 
However the jurisprudence has interpreted, the mentioned LVG 
art.1, in relation to article 148.4 and 153 both CP, in the sense that 
not every injury can be considered as gender violence and therefore 
cannot be applied automatically compounded rate, as it has been 
applied not on few occasions, with little successful forensic phrase 
“every offense of injures becomes a crime”, in reference to the 
application of LVG.  
Thus, the jurisprudential line of the Provincials Courts, ratified 
by the Supreme Court, indicates that the general application of art. 
153 CP, because to be applied as a crime of violent mistreatment in 
the family, it is necessary that the facts reported and committed by a 
man, start from a situation of domination or subjugation on the part 
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of the active-male subject on the passive subject or that occur in a 
context of domination of the active subject over the weak member 
of the family relationship. That is why the art. 153 CP in cases of 
mutually accepted quarrel as it is considered as crime. In addition, the 
jurisprudence indicates that the type contained in art. 153 CP must be 
applied restrictively in its application, so that the behavior described 
in the criminal type is a clear manifestation of two requirements that 
must be given simultaneously: the first domestic violence and the 
second gender violence.
The problem arises when it try to delimit each concept, i.e.,to 
define what is meant by domestic violence and what is meant by 
gender-based violence, because actually  it doesn’t know exactly 
what  means  every concept, because these concepts are interrelated 
between them and most of the people think that are the same things, 
even by the judges, that they aren’t able to understand the differences.
The jurisprudence has attempted to clarify it in several resolutions, 
defining each concept when applying art. 153 CP, because the concept 
of domestic violence is not expressly defined by the legislator in the 
way that day with the LVG is now defined and configured the concept 
of gender-based violence. Why has differentiated them dictating so 
textually “It is a question of two heterogeneous concepts, although 
related both by their common relation with the domestic concept. 
The first one refers to the spatial and affective scope in which the 
relations of familiar coexistence are developed (with generality, like 
clause of closure in the legal enumeration, includes any relationship 
for the person integrated into the nucleus of familiar coexistence of 
the active subject) more intense and continuous as determined by law. 
The second refers to a peculiar form of violence produced within this 
scope, elevated to the category of sociological phenomenon clearly 
identified, and characterized by the situation of abuse or domination 
that develops one of the members or subjects of such family relations, 
on other subjects of the same”.
Therefore, in the meaning of domestic violence the manifestations 
of a situation of abuse, domination or subjugation of a relative to 
another relative and by extension the same situations of abuse on the 
people that by their special vulnerability are put under custody or 
guarded in public or private centers.
Regarding to the concept of gender violence, the LVG’s 
explanatory statement begins by stating that “gender violence is not 
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a problem that affects the private sphere. On the contrary, it manifests 
itself as the most brutal symbol of inequality in our society. It is a 
violence directed against women by the very fact of being, because 
they are considered, by their aggressors, lacking the minimum rights 
of freedom, respect and decision-making”.
We cannot forget that the purpose of the LVG is to “... act against 
violence which, as a manifestation of discrimination, the situation of 
inequality and the power relations of men over women, is exercised 
over these by part of those who are or have been their spouses or of 
those who are or have been linked to them by similar relationships 
of affection, even without coexistence”, as stated in Article 1.1 LVG.
In the art. 1.2 it is said that this law establishes measures of 
comprehensive protection against gender violence, whose purpose 
is, among other things, to sanction manifestations of this type of 
violence. And, in connection with this, in Title IV of the law, on 
“criminal tutelage” against gender violence, almost all articles 
that are related to gender violence are modified. Thus, art. 37 LVG 
changes the wording of art. 153 CP, under the heading “protection 
against ill-treatment”. And several articles of this Title IV of the Law 
repeatedly use the concept of gender violence and crimes related to 
gender violence and reform some articles of the COP that expressly 
use the concept of crimes related to violence of genre.
Consequently, once exposed the previous reasoning in relation to 
the  mentioned art. 153 CP and its correct application, it is necessary 
to take into account as a basic principle the concepts of gender 
violence and gender violence. Thus the criminal conduct in art. 153.1 
CP would be the manifestation of discrimination, the situation of 
inequality and power relations of men over women basic motive of 
the LVG and any mistreatment that meets these characteristics would 
constitute constituted offenses and punished in arts. 617 and 620 CP. 
Therefore, any maltreatment, even if the active subject is the male 
and the passive subject the woman, cannot be classified as gender 
violence and automatically apply art.153 CP if the facts reputed do 
not contain the characteristics of those we have been speaking, since 
the facts must carry a plus translated in discrimination or abuse on 
the part of the male towards the woman in situations of inequality.
In these terms has been pronounced, constitutional jurisprudence 
in sentences that delimit perfectly the application of art. 153 CP, 
helping to clarify the confusion that has occurred with the entry 
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into force of the LVG. Thus, it determines that “... the action must 
injure beyond physical integrity and must be an instrument of 
discrimination, domination or subjugation of any of the subjects that 
it comprises. In another case, the penal sanction should be limited to 
the lack of injuries, abuse or the threat defined by arts. 617 and 620 
of the CP”.
II Study of jurisprudential and doctrinal lines
Once defined, the concepts of domestic violence and gender 
violence, in the previous section for the correct application of arts. 
153 related to the 617 and 620 CP, arises the need to delve deeper into 
the problem, since although earlier we are responsible for explaining 
when it is possible to apply art. 153 CP and when not, it is now 
necessary to explain the wording of sections 1 and 2 of art. 153 CP 
because the differentiation it makes of the sexes has raised many 
questions of unconstitutionality for this same cause, by affecting the 
art. 10 EC for violation of the dignity of the person, the rights of 
equality art. 14 EC and the presumption of innocence art. 24.2 EC4.
This punitive differentiation established by the sexes is precisely 
the one that has raised issues of unconstitutionality by magistrates 
themselves, even to the point of not having unanimity in the 
Constitutional Court, reflected in the ruling and formally departing5 
from it. However, currently the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (TC), is not exempt from controversies, there is a rich case law 
on the constitutionality or not of the articles that have been reformed 
by the LVG, interpreting how they should be understood, since from 
the entry into force of the LVG, have rained the appeals and issues 
of unconstitutionality.
Without going further, the difference existing in the wording 
of paragraphs 1 and 2 of art.153 C.P. can lead to think of its 
unconstitutionality, by affecting the aforementioned art. 14 EC, 
because it differentiates between the male aggressor, causes a psychic 
impairment, an injury or strikes or mistreats to whoever or has been 
his wife or has had a relationship of affectivity or that which does not 
and moves in which the paragraph 1, punishes with imprisonment 
from six months to one year or work for the benefit of the community 
between thirty and one to eighty days, always with the deprivation 
of the right of possession and possession of arms for a year and a 
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day to three years. On the other hand, paragraph 2 only punishes the 
same facts, but without offended persons being those indicated in the 
previous section, with a penalty of three months to one year or works 
for the benefit of the community between thirty and one eighty days 
and always deprivation of the right to possession and possession of 
weapons of one year and one day to three years.
The TC assumes that there are several ways of interpreting 
art. 153 CP and to understand it in purity, two relevant precisions 
must be made; the first is that the perpetrator of the crime does not 
necessarily have to be a male, but a female can also be a result of the 
different interpretations that this art can give. The second precision 
is that in the text of art. 153.1CP, another alternative passive subject 
is included, alluding as a particularly vulnerable person who lives 
with the author. Well, in the first precision it can be understood that 
the type “that” this is as part of the doctrine.
The TC, regarding the collision of art. 153.1 CP with the 
constitutional precepts infringed, that is, arts. 10, 14 and 24.2 
CE, resolves it in a way not exempt from criticism, made by 
the doctrine and even by its own magistrates, reflected in their 
particular votes. The TC defends the constitutionality of art.153 
CP, claiming that it does not violate art.14 SC, since it contains two 
differentiated principles, the principle of equality and prohibitions of 
discrimination, this means that all Spaniards are equal before the law 
and have a subjective right to obtain equal treatment, and the public 
authorities must respect it and must be citizens treated in exactly the 
same way in equal assumptions are treated identically in their legal 
consequences, and differentiation can be made only where there is 
sufficient, reasonable and sound justification and the consequences 
of which are not disproportionate.
Thus, the doctrine of the TC in relation to the principle of equality 
contained in art. 14 SC, has been requiring the legislator when it 
intends to introduce rules that establish a differentiation that may 
be called into question, the said principle of equality that these rules 
first show a discernible and legitimate aim, secondly that the rules 
must be articulated with logical consistency with that aim and thirdly 
not to incur disproportionate treatment when different rights and 
obligations, or any other subjective legal situations, are attributed to 
different groups and categories6.
In relation to the prohibition of discrimination of the text of 
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art. 14 SC, the TC, in general, in relation to the list of grounds 
of discrimination, which are strictly prohibited by Article 14 SC, 
has been declaring the constitutional illegitimacy of differentiated 
treatments in relation to those that operate or are not founded more 
than in the specific grounds of discrimination that said art. prohibits. 
Nevertheless the TC admits that the grounds of discrimination that 
the art. 14 SC prohibits can be used exceptionally as a criterion of 
legal differentiation, such as sex, although to judge the legitimacy of 
the dispute and the requirements of proportionality is much stricter, 
as is the burden of proving the justified character of differentiation. 
That is to say, that on the one hand the same motifs of which he 
speaks the text of art. 14 SC, as grounds of discrimination, they 
may be applied exceptionally, where the legislature considers it 
appropriate in a number of circumstances which are also exceptional, 
the latter having to provide a more rigorous proof of the reasons for 
the differentiation7.
That means, that on the one hand the same raisons of which he 
speaks the text of art. 14 SC, as grounds of discrimination, they may 
be applied exceptionally, if the legislature so decides in a number 
of exceptional circumstances, which must provide a more rigorous 
proof of the reasons for differentiation. “Finally, it is not imperative 
to recall that, according to the jurisprudence of this Court, when faced 
with equal or seemingly equal situations a challenge based on art. 
14 corresponds to those who assume the defense of the challenged 
legality and therefore the defense of the inequality created by such 
legality, the burden of offering the foundation of that difference 
that covers the requirements of rationality and necessity in order 
to protect the purposes and values  constitutionally worthy and, if 
appropriate, proposed by the legislator, to which we have referred 
previously. Thus, it is stated in the aforementioned judgment that 
“... Finally, it is not imperative to recall that, according to the 
jurisprudence of this Court, when faced with equal or seemingly 
equal situations a challenge based on art. 14 corresponds to those 
who assume the defense of the challenged legality and therefore 
the defense of the inequality created by such legality, the burden of 
offering the foundation of that difference that covers the requirements 
of rationality and necessity in order to protect the purposes and 
values constitutionally worthy and, if appropriate, proposed by the 
legislator, to which we have referred earlier”.
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It is clear that there is a breach between equality before the law of 
the sexes and the prohibition of discrimination of art.14 SC. Thus, the 
CT holds and defends, that the legislator has exclusive competence 
and is free to create laws, to enact certain behaviors that may be 
criminal and consequently punishable, establishing the penalties 
that bear those typical, unlawful behaviors within the limits of EC, 
following the principles of legality and proportionality. Therefore, 
it is the legislator who has to protect legal assets and can set rates, 
and may add a surcharge to prevent criminal behavior and to protect 
certain groups that require special protection.
Thus, it is incumbent upon the TC to analyze whether the legislator 
in its role of creating laws has adjusted to the limitations imposed by 
the SC with respect to the principle of equality and not to assess 
whether the penalties provided are excessive, fair or that they can 
comply better its teleological function.
Likewise in the TC in this question has been scrupulous in 
determining if the principle of equality is violated, demanding that 
the premises of the comparison be closely delimited that should 
be intrinsically linked to the regulation challenged, giving it an 
importance notorious for the choice of “tertium comparationis”.
It is noteworthy that the State Attorney General’s Office has been 
pronouncing in a manner consistent with the principle of gender 
equality as in the mentioned STC of November 22, 19838, adding two 
concepts that are sometimes confused, since there is a difficult and 
fine delimitation, which are equality before the law and in the law, 
ie, it is not enough that the Law be applied universally and equally 
with respect to all those who find themselves in equal situations, but 
that the Law itself comes and to establish an equal treatment for all 
individuals, or groups, that are in the identity of situations9.
In other countries this problem has also arisen, for example in 
Switzerland10, and our TC has treated it almost identically as regards 
the distinction between “equality in law” and “equality before the 
law”, and influenced in its decisions in this case other countries like 
Germany or Italy. 
Returning to Spain, the TC had followed this same line. Thus, 
in the STC (Sentence of Constitutional Court) of July 14, 1982, 
he maintained that “the general rule of equality before the Law 
contained in art. 14 EC provides, first, equality in the treatment 
given by the Law or equality in the Act and constitutes, from this 
point of view, a limit placed on the exercise of legislative power, but 
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is also equal in the application of the Law ...”.
In addition, there are many resolutions in which it is pronounced, 
such as the STC of 10 July 1981, which states that: “... the principle 
of equality contains a prohibition of discrimination, of in such a way 
that equal treatment must be given equal treatment “but does not 
suppose or” prohibits the legislator from contemplating the need or 
convenience of differentiating different situations and giving them 
a different treatment that may even be required, in a social and 
democratic State of law, for the effectiveness of the values  that the 
Constitution enshrines with the character of superiors of the Order ... 
What prohibits the principle of legal equality is discrimination ... that 
is, that the inequality of legal treatment is unjustified because it is not 
reasonable” STC of November 12, 1981; Sentence that is reiterated 
in the STC of February 26, 1982 in which after remembering that 
“The said principle of equality ... binds to all the public powers 
because this is strongly affirmed by art. 53.1SC...”, again stresses 
the idea that” ... the aforementioned article 14 SC is that relating to 
the right of legal equality which prohibits discrimination or, in other 
words, that inequality of legal treatment is unjustified because it is 
not reasonable ... “. 
Once delimited and explained the above we can enter into the 
possible unconstitutionality of art. 153.1 CP. The TC continues to 
defend the constitutionality of this art. to understand that its normative 
and punitive difference, which establishes the legislator is based on 
the desire to punish aggressions that he understands are more serious 
and more reprehensible from the social point of view, because they 
occur within the relationships of the couple fruit of the historically 
existing inequality, which makes the woman in a subordinate 
position in relation to the man. That is why the TC understands that 
this wording does not violate the principle of equality of art.14 SC, 
but according to the same jurisprudential doctrine of this art. “... the 
differentiated treatment of equal factual assumptions has an objective 
and reasonable justification and does not have disproportionate 
consequences in the differentiated situations in view of the purpose 
pursued by such differentiation”11.
Well, the wording of art. 153 CP, amended by L. O. 1/2004, of 
December 28, is constitutional according to the TC itself. This law, 
commonly referred to as gender violence, states in its explanatory 
memorandum that the purpose of this law is to prevent aggressions 
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occurring in the context of the couple as a manifestation of the 
domination of men over women in such a context, that the basic 
assets of women, such as life, physical integrity, health, freedom 
and dignity, are not adequately protected and for this reason it does 
not hesitate to repress this type of violence with several measures, 
including criminal measures. Therefore, the difference of arts. 153.1 
and 153.2 CP, in the opinion of the TC is legitimate and appropriate 
because it protects the woman in the relations of couple by the 
greater devalue and the greater gravity of the acts of violence that 
undermine their dignity of person and in addition that difference is 
functional, because it delimits the active and passive subjects of the 
type, attributing an exclusive penalty to the men as active subjects, 
being the women subjects passive.
Now, there are differences of the active subject, since not every 
aggression by the man towards the woman, will be punished with the 
application of automatic form according to the art. 153 CP, because 
such aggression must respond to a “manifestation of discrimination, 
inequality, and power relations between men and women” and as 
provided by the L.O. 1/2004 of 28 December. That is why, with the 
aggravation of the sentence, the legislator, in the opinion of the TC 
acts in a legitimate way, because it tries to avoid that this type of 
aggression continues in the area of  couple relationships, because 
the legislator understands that these aggressions in this area they 
represent a greater damage when the man acts according to a cultural 
pattern influenced by the means, trying to avoid thus new aggressions 
to be greater punitive consequences for the active-man subject 
dissuading them from committing the same acts in the future. Thus, 
with legislative reform, women benefit by having more autonomy 
to decide, safeguarding their dignity as a person and making the 
principle of equality of the art.14 CE.
Therefore the TC understands that the legislator, when creating 
LO 1/2004 of December 28, complies with the EC and does not 
transgress it, because it believes that the highest penalty is not 
imposed by reason of the sex of the active subject, nor of the victim, 
but by the commission of more serious events that constitute a 
manifestation of violence and inequality. 
Likewise, the TC understands that this legislative differentiation 
contained in LO 1/2004 of December 28, complies with the 
jurisprudential doctrine of the TC, when observing the requirements 
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of reasonableness, equality and proportionality, becoming 
unconstitutional in the case of in that said law would “appreciate a 
patent unreasonable and excessive unreasonable”12.
As we have already indicated, the TC’s foundation of the 
constitutionality of the LVG and the precepts that have modified 
it, with its entry into force has not been free of criticism, the most 
important if there have been doubts have been those of the magistrates 
of the TC, who have been unmarked from the TC line with their 
particular votes.
Thus, Conde Martín de Hijas, is quite critical with STC 59/2008, 
part of the basis that the difference established between paragraph 
1 of art. 153 CP and section 2, is neither correct nor constitutional, 
since it is based simply and simply on a differentiation made by the 
sexes, contrary to the principle of equality of art. 14 EC, because 
the conduct or aggression of art. 153.1 CP has greater devaluation 
and therefore more gravity than those of art. 153.2 CP, that is to say, 
the aggressions that occur in the realm of the couple when they are 
produced by the man towards the woman are punished with a greater 
punishment, than when in these relations of pair the aggression 
realizes the woman towards the man.
In addition, Conde Martín de Hijas believes that, because of the 
fact that human aggression against women is more frequent in this 
area, it is not sufficient reason to establish a greater penalty for man, 
since it would be purely based to the sex of the author and victim 
of the crime, thus transgressing the constitutional framework. For 
that reason, he thinks that although in the foundation of  STC13, he 
endeavors to demonstrate and argue otherwise, it is simply the sex of 
the active and passive subjects a determining factor of differentiated 
treatments, which is totally incompatible with art. 14 EC. It also 
criticizes the TC of course that in today’s relationship there is a 
relationship of inequality and a subordinate position of women, as it 
was in a past tense.
Regarding the analysis of art. 153 CP from the point of view of 
the principle of equality, Conde Martín de Hijas believes that it does 
not meet the jurisprudential requirements that have been demanded. 
It would be enough in her judgment, not to establish in any case a 
typological differentiation by sex, but simply, could raise the same 
type contained in art. 153.2 CP, to an equal or greater degree, thus 
solving the problem of the greater devaluation in the aggressions of 
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the male to the woman in the realm of the couple. Therefore resolved 
in this way, it would not be necessary to establish punitive differences 
on the basis of sex, since, as is currently the case, paragraphs 1 and 
2 of art. 153 CP, do not meet the requirements of reasonability or 
functionality.
Another important opinion is that of Rodríguez Zapata Pérez14, who 
criticizes that the wording of art.153.1CP has been left deliberately 
open by the legislator and creates legal insecurity for citizens, being 
contrary to the principle of legality of Article 25 EC, because its 
limits are not clear enough, which means that citizens do not know 
exactly what is prohibited for them to try to avoid the consequences 
of their actions, thus leading to legal uncertainty that is incompatible 
with the principle of certain lex or imperative of taxativity.
All this is in my view, because of the poor approach and defense 
mechanisms against men and women, since there is often an “abuse” 
of measures often unjustified and most of the time excessive or 
disproportionate, which contributes to a covert rebellion of the 
punished, because of the condition that the LVG has operated 
in various regulations such as criminal or civil, leading to deaths 
not only women but also the family around them, many times. In 
addition statistically with the entry into force of the LVG, as we 
have said previously nothing has been solved and there has not been 
an evolution to leave this scourge behind. At the foot of the street 
is not understood the LVG nor the defense that is made, with the 
reasons defended in STC 59/2009 or in STC 45/2009, in the sense 
of punishing the aggressor man with the reformed art. 153.1 CP, 
when you attack a female who is or has been his partner, but not vice 
versa applying art. 147 CP, which includes the crime of injury or, if 
applicable, a fault recorded in 617 CP.
As Vázquez Sotelo15 has pointed out, in an inordinate effort 
to protect the female sex, an organic and economic effort has 
been made to create specialized courts only for battered women 
(sometimes allegedly assaulted, given the fraudulent use of the Law 
to prepare divorce petitions), which can only be attended by the 
battered woman, but not the cohabiting man if it turns out to be the 
one attacked or when the aggression has been mutual.  Apart from 
what was previously explained, what has not contributed at all to 
the solution of the aggressions as a couple has been the massive and 
indiscriminate application of the precautionary measures that has 
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brought the application of the LVG.
For example we have normally, that after formalizing the 
complaint and at the time of decision by the Court, they dictate 
coupled measures precautionary way almost summary, such 
as distance, communication ban order, imposition or visitation 
restrictions and it is here where lies one of the problems that the 
LVG has not succeeded and consequently not been almost eradicated 
the problem of gender-based violence.
For example, we normally have, after the complaint has been 
formalized and at the time of issuing a decision by the court, 
precautionary measures are issued in a summary form, such as 
restraining order, prohibition of communication, imposition or 
restriction of visits and it is here that one of the problems resides that 
the LVG has not been successful and consequently the problem of 
gender violence has not been almost eradicated.
Therefore, in my opinion, the LVG suffers from two defects 
that makes it ineffective in reducing victims. The first defect is the 
punitive differentiation between the sexes, which in my opinion 
goes against art.14 SC, since it is not constitutional that different 
penalties are applied in different articles, depending only on the 
sex of the aggressor. In my opinion, if the same aggressions were 
penalized equally without regard to sex as a differentiating object, 
the LVG would be more effective, since the aggressors of both sexes 
would be punished equally and would be imposed in their case same 
precautionary measures, not being used as is often done in practice 
with a purpose other than mere protection in cases of aggression or 
situations of non-equality or abuse of power. The second of the defects 
is in my opinion, the massive, undue and indiscriminate application 
of precautionary measures, against the man who has been denounced, 
subsequently charged and finally convicted. The application of these 
measures, such as a restraining order, a ban on communication, the 
restriction of the visitation regime or the prohibition of residing in the 
family home, are measures of great juridical and social importance 
because they imply a difficult burden to cope with the scarcity of 
means that generally characterize aggressors.
In addition, there are often cases in which, as I have already 
explained, for example the alleged victim uses the LVG to obtain 
a way out of a controversial situation in his home, removing the 
alleged perpetrator from the environment, establishing measures 
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that we talked about earlier such as the prohibition of the use of the 
common family home or the imposition of a regime of visits in a 
very short time, or being used for an express divorce. One can thus 
see how far the question is posed from the theme of the principle 
of equality conceived in its deepest ethical sense in the function 
of eliminating arbitrary discriminations that postpone a person by 
reason of a personal or social condition that does not legitimizes such 
discrimination. Another problem of the LVG is when the complaint 
is false or when the conduct denounced, does not enjoy criminal 
reproach and the accused is acquitted or the case is overturned after 
reported the allegedly unlawful acts, which, in any case, will be 
studied in another section.
Conclusions
The organic law 1/2004 of 28 December, discriminates against 
the male by the mere fact of being so, favoring and overprotected 
absurdly to women against of the man. 
This goes against the fundamental rights enshrined in the Spanish 
Constitution, and seriously violate principles such as the equality of 
the sexes, or the principle of equality in the law or the principle of 
innocence.
The violence against Women Act, establishes, as a differentiating 
factor, sex, to legislate unfairly, not fair nor effective, so that the sex 
of a person, in this case man becomes criteria determinative, when 
it is punished behaviors. Thus, exactly the same acts committed by a 
man or by a woman, who live together or have had a relationship of 
affection, will have a different penal treatment, i.e., if it is man will 
apply the law 1/2004, but on the other hand, if you are a woman It 
will be applied with other articles of the Criminal Code, of course 
more benevolent and without having rigged measures precautionary 
as severe as those that are in the law   and disproportionate.
For example, if a man hits a woman that has lived or had a 
relationship slightly, applies it the law of gender violence with 
its restrictive measures, for example, the restriction approach, 
communicate and of course live together in appropriate, however if 
the woman that hits slightly to a man that has lived or had a romantic 
relationship, are only fined and if it must compensate economically 
man injury if any Needless to make more comments, in relation to 
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the difference in legal treatment.
This law is without doubt, a law unfair because it is not equity 
between both sexes and also contradicts itself because in its preamble 
that its reason or motive primary, is to advocate for gender equality 
in society between men and women and in the law. However it does 
the opposite, discriminates against the man by his condition of man 
and delves into the social and legal inequality of sexes.
The law of gender violence has not come to solve the existing 
problems, the contrary has aggravated these problems resulting in 
currently a clear in society division, there is a clear legal inequality 
and a law unjust and ineffective, that does not help to solve any 
problem.
As for the courts, have been raised numerous appeal of 
unconstitutionality even by judges, who see unfair and attempted 
against the man, resolving ultimately the Constitutional Court that 
the law of gender violence not contradicts any precept or principle of 
the Constitution, but in a situation of inequality and preponderance 
of man tries to apply also unequal measures to fight such inequality, 
which has historically benefited men what is certainly something 
antijuridic, not equitable, and ineffective, as it is being seen today 
after the entry into force of this Act, she has not been solved nothing, 
on the contrary, the problem has worsened.
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Anotācija
Raksta mērķis ir noskaidrot atsevišķas atšķirības un 
nekonsekvences, kas radās sakarā ar 2004. gada 28. decembra 
likuma Nr.1 stāšanos spēkā, jo minētais likums, autoraprāt, aizstāv 
vienīgi sieviešu tiesības, atstājot nenoregulētas vīriešu tiesības, 
noskaidrot likuma piemērošanas aspektus un kādas konsekvences 
vai nekonsekvences katrā konkrētā gadījumā rodas atkarībā no tā, 
vai cietusī persona ir sieviete vai vīrietis.
Lai atbilstoši pētījuma mērķim padziļināti izanalizētu pētāmo 
objektu, tika lietotas šādas zinātniskās pētniecības metodes: 
analītiskā, induktīvā un deduktīvā, loģiskā, sistēmiskā un salīdzinošā.
Raksta galvenie secinājumi saistāmi ar to, ka spēkā esošie 
likumi, autoraprāt, ir netaisnīgi, tie vienlīdz neaizstāv vīriešu 
tiesības, kā arī negarantē sieviešu tiesību aistāvību gadījumos, kad 
tās tiek pakļautas seksuālai vardarbībai. Autors iestājas par likumu 
grozījumu nepieciešamību, kuru pieņemšanas gadījumā tiktu vienlīdz 
nodrošināta jebkura dzimuma aizsardzība pret seksuālo vardarbību.
